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Abstract This article assumes a specific intuitive notion
of complexity as a difficulty to generate and/or assess the
plausibility of models. Based on this intuitive understand-
ing of complexity, it identifies two main causes of com-
plexity, namely, radical openness and contextuality. The
former is the idea that there are no natural systems. The
modeler always needs to draw artificial boundaries around
phenomena to generate feasible models. Contextuality is
intimately connected to the requirement to simplify models
and to leave out most aspects. Complexity occurs when
contextuality and radical openness cannot be contained that
is when it is not clear where the boundaries of the system
are and which abstractions are the correct ones. This con-
cept of complexity is illustrated using a number of example
from evolution.
Keywords Complexity  Evolution  Artificial life 
Contextuality
Introduction
It can be extraordinarily difficult to develop models to
predict or indeed explain phenomena. Some phenomena
resist being modeled. This resistance is often called
‘‘complexity.’’ Of course, modeling always requires con-
siderable skill and experience and is therefore hard to do.
Theoretical physicists, for example, must be acquainted
with quite deep mathematics. In some areas of theoretical
physics, modeling techniques can get so difficult that there
may be only a handful of people who master these meth-
ods. This is not what we mean by ‘‘complex.’’ Modeling in
physics still leads to models that are general in scope and
often relatively simple (even aestheticly pleasing) and they
also have a clear path to experimental corroboration. This
is not so in the above mentioned domains that are com-
monly associated with complexity. They effectively resist
being captured by general and universal models that allows
the unification of a large number of phenomena within a
single elegant theory. Climate change, economics, and
evolution are all complex in the sense that they require
large, messy models that are difficult to formulate and
uncertain in their status.
To the untrained eye, this kind of complexity should not
come as a great surprise. In our daily experiences, we do
expect to observe some regularity. The sun sets and rises
every day (inmost parts of the world anyway), organisms are
born and die, objects fall to the ground, bedrooms get messy,
and so on. There are many such regularities, but we do not,
intuitively expect any deep connection between them, any
universal law from which everything can be deduced.
The view from physics, where simple and universal
laws, ‘‘grand unified theories’’ or ‘‘theories of everything’’
are expected and searched for, seems somewhat spoiled.
Real life is messy. Yet, often there is a demand to model
phenomena that are more like real life than the idealized
world of theoretical physics. Most fields of enquiry are not
captured by simple and general theories. This is what we
mean by complexity.
This article is about complexity. Specifically, we will
investigate the causes of complexity. In order to do this, we
have to start with a basic intuition about what we mean by
complexity. Within the context of this article, we will
interpret complexity as the difficulty to find suitable (for-
mal) models (either predictive or explanatory) for the
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phenomena we are interested in. We acknowledge that
there are other ideas about complexity. For example, in the
literature complexity is often associated with certain types
of computer simulations [‘‘complex adaptive systems’’
(Holland 1995; 1998; Bedau and Smith 1999)] that show
interesting (‘‘emergent’’) behavior arising from simple
interactions only (such as, for example, in the famous
Game of Life). These models convinced some that com-
plexity can arise out of simplicity. Motivated by models of
insects that demonstrate how elaborate structures can be
built by very simple automata-like agents, there has been a
lot of excitement for some time: One of the implications of
this notion of complexity is that complexity is only
apparent and can, if one is clever enough, be reduced to
fundamentally simple rules that elegantly unify many of
the apparently messy phenomena we observe [see, for
example, the notion of universality classes (Bak 1997;
Stanley et al. 1996a, b, )].
Another idea of complexity is to see it as some sort of
intricate order that is resilient to random shocks. For exam-
ple, gene regulatory networks, while large and highly con-
nected, are also well controlled and resilient to noise and
most minor structural changes. This is sometimes called
complexity [see, for example, (Noble 2009)]. Complexity is
also used to denote the opposite, namely, chaos and disorder,
possibly arising from very simple interactions. Sometimes
complexity is associated with certain anti-reductionist
approaches to science, sometimes complexity is equated
with non-linearity, sometimes complexity is used to justify
reductionism (Wynne 2005). And then there are countless
more or less well defined other meanings of the word
complexity.
Altogether, it seems that there is a lack of consensus not
only on the precise definition of complexity, but also on the
basic intuition behind the concept. Having arrived at this
point one now has to make a choice. Either one accepts that
complexity is a word that can mean many things without
doing harm. Or, one decides that there is something of
deeper interest behind one or more of the possible mean-
ings and decide to investigate this in more detail. In this
article, we take the latter approach. We think that a notion
of complexity-as-a-difficulty-to-model is relevant and
deserves a deeper analysis. It crops up in all the big
questions of our time, from climate change to credit
crunch. Understanding complexity in this sense means
understanding what precisely it is that makes it so hard to
model certain things, while others are easy to model. This
is, in essence the question we will address in this contri-
bution. We will therefore, in what follows, understand
complexity exclusively as this difficulty to find suitable
models, and exclude other meanings.
In order to understand some of the factors that make
modeling hard, we will introduce the concepts of radical
openness and contextuality. These concepts will be defined
in Sects. 5 and 6, respectively, and refer to very specific
difficulties of the modeling process. Most practicing
modelers will, we suspect, be quite familiar with the basic
ideas behind these two concepts although many will not
recognize them as particularly problematic. Below we will
argue that in many cases both radical openness and con-
textuality can be easily overcome, but then there are cases
when this is no longer the case. In this latter case we have
complexity.
Common misconceptions about complexity
There exists a vast body of literature on complexity. Much
of it is concerned with modeling, some of it probes the
notion of complexity itself. Either way, there are two
themes that dominate much of this literature and have
perhaps become accepted as an integral part of complexity:
the notion of ‘‘complex system’’ and the idea of measures
of complexity. At least as far as the intuition about com-
plexity underlying this article is concerned, these ideas are
not useful.
Complexity and complex systems
The notion of complexity is often associated with the
notion of system (as, for example, in the term ‘‘complex
systems’’). The idea of systems is widely used in the sci-
ences and normally refers to a well-defined part of the
world which is in some sense independent from the rest of
the world (the ‘‘environment’’). Complex systems are then
just the same only that the systems are complex rather than
‘‘not complex.’’ Often cited examples of such complex
systems are organisms, economies, or the climate, to name
but a few.
The concept of ‘‘system’’ seems rather innocuous at first,
and within the context of everyday scientific communica-
tion it is. There is no harm done in referring to, say, a
particular operon in E. coli as the system, or to the economy
of Germany as a system. Within the normal discourse in
science, everybody knows what is meant. Unfortunately, in
the context of complexity (as we understand it here) it will
become clear that the notion of a system being complex is
misleading. The reason is that the difficulty of modeling
(i.e., the complexity) does not primarily depend on some
inherent properties of real world entities, as the notion of a
‘‘complex system’’ might suggest. This notion implicitly
assumes that there is a natural partition of the world into
system and non-system (or systems and environment) and
that this partition can somehow be discovered by the
modeler. For every modeling exercise the modeler picks out
one of these systems and represents them mathematically or
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otherwise. If she is unlucky, then the one she picked is
complex and therefore quite difficult to represent.
We think it does not take a long argument to convince
the reader that this picture is not particularly realistic. At
the heart of the problem is the idea that there are natural
systems out there or, as we will call them henceforth,
systems an sich. Instead, we will argue below that any
particular system definition is a choice that mostly depends
on the specific purposes that motivated the modeling
exercise. Once we accept this, then complexity is first and
foremost dependent on these purposes rather than the
innate properties of any system an sich.
This idea that complexity is a property of the modeling
purpose rather than of the ‘‘system’’ to be modeled will be
argued over the remainder of this contribution. For the
moment we will illustrate this point using an example. Let
us assume that it makes sense to assume that complexity is
a property of a system an sich and for the sake of the
argument let us also assume that organisms are such
complex systems. We now note that the alleged complexity
of organisms does not prevent anybody from modeling
some of their aspects or parts, sometimes to a high degree
of accuracy using very simple models.
For example, gene expression can be modeled using a
single differential equation. Such models, simple as they
are, can give very good insight and are regularly used in the
theoretical biology research literature. So apparently no
complexity there.
One can of course argue that the complexity of an
organism comes from the interaction of the genes. Genes
themselves are simple, but many genes together are not—
organism are not (there are some echos of complexity out
of simplicity here). This may well be true, but then again, it
is not inconceivable that in some modeling contexts entire
organisms could be represented extremely simple. How
much detail one takes into account in models depends
entirely on the perspective one takes that is on what needs
to be taken into account. To see this let us consider another
way to model the very same gene whose expression we
captured by a single differential equation, but now we want
a detailed model of the polymerases reading the DNA and
all its chemical interactions. Suddenly, we will find our-
selves bogged down by dependencies and interactions that
stretch our technical ability to the limit.
We conclude that It is possible to model gene expression
in a simple way by leaving out most of the detail. It is also
possible to make models of gene expression nearly arbi-
trarily difficult by including more and more detail or indeed
by including more and more of the processes on which
gene expression depends. There is nothing inherently
simple about a gene and the process of gene expression, but
there are ways to represent genes in a simplified matter that
makes it possible to study at least some of their aspects
using simple models. Similar ideas apply to any kind of
modeling exercise.
The question we have to ask now is the following: How
do we choose what is included into a model and what is left
out, how do we pick those phenomena and effects that are
important enough to be included and those that are not?
The key message that we will argue over the next pages is
that complexity is connected to the difficulty of making this
choice that is the difficulty of deciding what needs to be
included into a model and how, and what can be neglected
and left out.
This difficulty of creating and justifying the design of a
model (i.e., complexity), does not depend on the properties
of the world but on the purposes of the model and the kinds
of questions the modeler wishes to address. We can say this
more concisely that complexity depends on the modeler’s
purpose not on some properties of a ‘‘system an sich.’’ This
idea will be central to this article.
Complexity as size of a model
Before we can go on to develop a notion of complexity based
on the difficulty of modeling, a few comments on previous
attempts to define complexity are in place. Within com-
plexity research there exists a tradition to quantify com-
plexity. Measures of complexity are normally arrived at by
quantifying some aspects of a model and to take this as a
proxy for the complexity of an assumed system of which the
model is a representation. Measures of this sort have been
extensively discussed in the complex systems literature [see,
for example (Edmonds 1999; Rescher 1998; Gross and
Strand 2000)] and this contribution will therefore refrain
from reviewing quantitative notions of complexity. Suffice
to say that after more than a decade of research into com-
plexity, there is still no agreement on any preferred measure
of complexity. Common to all measures is that they in one
way or another attempt to put a number to the size of a
model, where ‘‘size’’ could mean the actual amount of
information to describe a system (Bennett 1986), the number
of components or types of components (McShea 1996),
measures of the interactions of individual components, or a
mixture of those. The difference between the individual
measures is how these various indicators of size are com-
bined to form a particular measure of complexity. There are
many ways to do this, and perhaps there are nearly as many
measures as there are authors. Unfortunately, various
notions of complexity tend to contradict one another in the
sense that rankings of models according to their complexity
will be very sensitive to the particular measure used.While a
model X may be more complex than model Y by one mea-
sure, another measure may rank Y as more complex.
In the practice of modeling considerations of the size of
a model are of course important. Large models tend to be
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computationally more expensive to analyze and they usu-
ally also require more parameters to be determined, and
take more time to code/formulate. A large part of the work
of a modeler is precisely to find simplifications that reduce
the size of models while preserving the particular key-
features and behaviors of the model that she is interested
in. Indeed, the success of a modeling venture will depend
on the modeler ignoring most of the features of a system
she is modeling, primarily concentrating her attention on a
few aspects only. Conversely, one could make any model
nearly arbitrarily large (in terms of size) by choosing to
include irrelevant features that do not impact on the final
result.
Intuitively, one would be inclined to believe that there is
a strong correlation between the minimum size of a model
and some fundamental properties of the natural system the
model is supposed to represent. Apart from some natural
variations due to different skills of modelers—one may
argue—the size of the model must certainly reflect some
property of some system an sich. At the very least, one
would expect that there are models of minimal size, for a
specific system. This intuition is, presumably, also what
motivates quantitative measures of complexity based on
properties of a model. However, we think this intuition is
misleading.
Before a modeler can formulate a model and interpret it
in the way one would normally find it published in scientific
articles, she has to go through a long and difficult process of
struggle. Scientific reports tend to give the impression that
the choices that went into a particular model are self-evident
and entirely determined by the nature of the phenomenon of
interest. This could not be further from reality. The finished
product is the result of a process in the course of which the
modeler modified and re-modified the model many times;
she will have simplified, approximated, assumed, and
omitted. The nature of these simplifications, approxima-
tions, assumptions, and omissions will be partially dictated
by the purpose of the modeling exercise, but partially they
will be choices that are not necessarily rational or logically
justifiable. We conclude that any particular model of a
system is not an unbiased representation of some objective
reality.
On the other hand, the idea of taking the size of a model
as a shortcut for the complexity of some natural system
tacitly assumes that this process of formulating the model
leads to an unbiased representation of the system, at least
as far as complexity is concerned. In particular, the idea of
‘‘measures of complexity’’ implies that there is an objec-
tively defined ‘‘thing’’ in the world (the system an sich) to
which the modeler has access. This system an sich also has
a degree of complexity, and the size of this model of the
system an sich reflects this complexity property. It has been
indicated above, and will be argued below that this idea of
a system an sich is incoherent. A more coherent view is to
accept that models are not truthful representations of the
real world, but they are abstractions that reflect a particular
purpose that motivated the modeling exercise. The system
is then defined by the model, rather than the model being
defined by the system.
In this article, we will therefore dismiss quantitative
notions of complexity, based on properties of models, as
irrelevant. Instead, we will develop and defend an alter-
native qualitative notion of complexity with the aim of
connecting complexity to the difficulty of finding suitable
abstractions of systems. This shifts the notion of com-
plexity away from being a property of models or elusive
systems to being a property of the process of finding
suitable models. We will argue that this interpretation gives
a more coherent view of complexity and is also of practical
use in that it helps understand why sometimes it is harder to
come up with a model than other times. Finally, we will
illustrate this view of complexity using an example from
computational modeling.
Formal and semantic models
Scientifically (or otherwise) we cannot reason directly
about systems an sich. There is no sense in which we can
mentally manipulate objects of the real world. All we can
do is to manipulate representations of these objects—
models. A corollary of this is that we cannot even compare
our models with systems an sich directly, but only with
other models. This is perhaps a commonplace, but at the
same time also a fine point in many contexts. We suspect
that much of the confusion about complexity is due to an
unclear notion of models and how they relate to the ‘‘real
world.’’
Working scientists distinguish between system and
model as a matter of routine and spend a great deal of time
worrying about how well the two match. Fundamentally,
this is of course sloppy thinking. Even scientists do not
have direct access to any system an sich, but they can only
compare the outputs of their measuring devices with the
predicted values of their models. In many contexts, it is
acceptable to be sloppy about the precise notions of and
relations between systems and models. In this contribution,
we cannot afford to be sloppy ,and we must make clear
distinctions. We are interested in complexity, and we want
to understand how models are created and what makes this
process of model creation difficult. We will therefore need
to take a closer look at models and their relation to the
system an sich. To do this, we will motivate the distinction
between formal models and semantic models. We will
argue that the former are, in a sense, a minor element in the
fabric of scientific knowledge/understanding which is
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woven from semantic models. Formal models are primarily
crutches to help reasoning, but do not contain any under-
standing in themselves. They need to be interpreted in
order to be useful. Once we have made this point, com-
plexity measures that focus on properties of formal models
will seem unnatural.
As a computational or mathematical scientist, one tends
to primarily think of models in terms of formal models, i.e.,
systems of equations, computational simulation programs
and so forth. Within certain communities in the natural
sciences, the word ‘‘model’’ is nearly universally identified
with such formal models. The main purpose of formal
models is to state relationships between variables. These
could be formulated in a variety of ways, including systems
of equations, sets of chemical reactions, computer code to
name but a few possibilities. Common to all these formal
models is that they are strictly objective and once specified
there can be very little disagreement about their properties.
A computer program, once written, will give more or less
the same results wherever it is run; equations have an
objectively verifiable set of solutions.1 Not everybody may
be able to find these solutions, but once a solution is found
a consensus concerning its correctness can quickly be
established.
There are many different types of formal models,
including differential equation models, computer simula-
tions, network representations, lists of chemical reactions,
and so on. In terms of the practice of research, there is
much to be said about the advantages and disadvantages
and the various types of formal models. Mathematical
models usually allow more general insights than simulation
models, but also suffer from tractability problems. The
choice of the correct type of formal model can be crucial
for the success of a project. However, as far as our present
purpose is concerned, various types of formal models only
differ in how they are solved, but are equivalent with
respect to their role in the modeling process overall.
Moreover, all formal models can be represented as com-
puter simulations, be it analytic mathematical models,
equation-based models in physics, or models of chemical
reaction systems. Conceptually, we may therefore (for
convenience) identify formal models with computer mod-
els, even though in practice there is a big difference
between the various types of formal models.
While formal models are conceptually unproblematic,
they are also, by themselves, scientifically useless. The
process by which formal models come about may require a
significant degree of ingenuity and creativity. Once the
formal model exists, then it is just a (normally quite
complicated) set of re-writing rules that can be applied to
some input (for instance an array of number) to produce an
output (which is often also an array of numbers). In and by
themselves, these numbers are, of course, just numbers. To
be informative for the modeler they need to be processed.
This processing step may involve some type of formal
processing, statistical, graphical, or otherwise. Yet, formal
processing of a set of meaningless numbers only gives
another set of meaningless numbers. To be of any use the
output of the formal model must be interpreted in the
context of existing models and woven into the fabric of
scientific understanding.
This scientific understanding/knowledge is contained
within the semantic models. The precise nature of these
semantic models is a difficult question. For example, it is
not entirely trivial to understand how they are created,
communicated, and processed internally. For the purpose
of this contribution it is not necessary to clarify these
potentially difficult philosophical questions in much detail,
although we do acknowledge that this needs to be
addressed eventually. Suffice to say that semantic models
form the main part of our ‘‘understanding’’ of the world
and of scientific theories. Formal models are just crutches
to help our reasoning. Semantic models are the real keepers
of scientific knowledge.
Semantic models are inexact and fallible. There can be
no precise agreement on semantic models because they
cannot be shared in an unambiguous manner between sci-
entists; this is simply a limitation of natural language.
Loosely, in scientific articles reporting modeling one can
identify the semantic models with the text that is
in-between the formulas, algorithms, and definitions. One
can assume that semantic models are (up to errors of rea-
soning and imprecisions) largely consistent with the formal
models, but they are of course not equivalent.2 Sometimes
there are mismatches between semantic models and formal
models leading to incorrect interpretations of the results.
An example is reported by McMullin and Varela (1997).
We are content with the following characterization of
semantic models:
– Semantic models are representations of scientific
knowledge. They are internal to the agent.
– Internal reasoning on semantic models is possibly
imprecise and always fallible.
1 The issue is not always quite as clear-cut. Particularly when it
comes to large-scale computational models there can be significant
problems to create a consensus on the properties of the model when it
is run on different platforms, or even differently configured versions
of the same platform. These problems certainly do exists, are
interesting and indeed important to consider and are also relevant for
complexity. However, as far as the following discussion is concerned,
they are an unnecessary complication in that they do not interfere with
the conclusion we will reach. We will therefore assume the simplest
case that formal models are unproblematic.
2 The various interpretations of Quantum Mechanics are an example
of disagreements on the semantic models while there is an agreement
on the syntactic models.
Theory Biosci.
123
– There is no clear distinction between semantic models
relating to scientific activities and trivial semantic
models about everyday life.
Crucial to the notion of complexity that we wish to
develop here is to understand how semantic and formal
models relate to one another. A formal model is an abstract
representation of a semantic model. In order to arrive at a
formal model, the modeler will go through an intense
process of simplification during which she will ignore most
of the aspects/contents of semantic models concentrating
on a few select aspects only. For one, the modeler needs to
limit herself to a specific domain of interest (say, gene
expression in mammals, chromatin re-modeling, etc). Once
this domain of interest is chosen, she then needs to decide
on a level of abstraction. This entails deciding on the
desired detail of the model, the dependencies and interac-
tions that are taken into account and those that are left out.
Both of these steps are essential to ensure feasibility of the
formal model.
Normally, formal models encode only a small subset of
the semantic models pertaining to the particular domain.
So, for example, a great deal is known about gene
expression, the function of polymerases, the chemical
interactions necessary for initiation of the transcription
process, the interaction of the polymerase with the DNA,
and so on. The modeler will have semantic models of all of
these processes and interactions. Yet, in a formal model of
gene expression many of these known interactions may be
ignored; a formal model may represent gene expression
simply as a single differential equation.
The system an sich does not feature anywhere in this.
However, to facilitate the following discussion, it is helpful
to re-introduce the notion of a system, although with a
slightly changed meaning (compared to the idea of system
an sich). Every formal model will have an interpretation
which will be a semantic model that exactly corresponds to
the formal model. One can identify the system with this
particular semantic model. In this sense, one can talk about
systems without having to refer to the unknown world of
systems an sich. This definition is also compatible with the
colloquial use of the word ‘‘system;’’ yet we stress that the
system in this sense is not an immutable thing out there, it
is not the system an sich, but it is choice that emerges from
the struggle of the scientist to develop a model. In this
sense, the system is determined by the modeling process
rather than the model being determined by the system.
How does the modeler arrive at the system definition, or
equivalently, how does the modeler choose the formal
model? This process of extracting the key-features of a
system is not a process that follows rules. Instead, it is an
iterative process of trial, resistance and success that even-
tually leads to the system at hand. A very enlightening
account of this process is given by Pickering (1995). Nei-
ther do we require such a description to understand com-
plexity. Yet, there is one key-factor that above all shapes
the abstraction process: The purpose of the modeler, i.e.,
the aims and objectives that motivate the modelers choice
of what to include and what not to include into the formal
model/system.
If one wishes, for example, to model the melting point
of of DNA molecules, it is not necessary to model quantum
mechanical effects, even though the interactions between
the nucleotides, and hence their melting point, are ulti-
mately determined by these interactions. Instead, one will
seek to remove nearly everything known about the DNA
and only represent those features that are relevant for the
melting process, which in this case is the base-pair com-
position of the molecule together with information about
the stability of the individual bonds. On the other hand, a
formal model with the purpose of understanding how
transcription-factors find their binding sites will be differ-
ent. It will normally not consider the binding strength
between base-pairs at all and instead only focus on the
sequence of nucleotides on the DNA string and calculate
from this the protein–nucleotide interactions. The purposes
behind these two models are very different from one
another, motivating very different formal models and thus
systems.
Once one has chosen a formal model, the question arises
how one can know that this formal model is useful, in the
sense that it either reflects the quantitative behavior of
the system accurately, or at least provides a qualitative
explanation for it. Again, this question is fraud with
philosophical difficulties; treating these in detail would not
only go well beyond the scope of this article, but would
also be distracting from the main question we are trying to
address here. Without committing to any particular view on
this we can state that laboratory system often plays a role in
instilling confidence in a model. Laboratory systems are
real world entities that are artificially screened from envi-
ronmental disturbances, usually by elaborate experimental
techniques. Key to laboratory systems is that they can be
manipulated, if not at will, then at least to considerable
extents. The primary aim of experimental science is to be
able to create and manipulate ever more sophisticated
laboratory systems. For the modeler experimental systems
can be the reference against which she assesses the quality
of her models. They may enable her to assess the useful-
ness of the abstraction. Ideally, the laboratory system is a
real world implementation of the formal model ( i.e., it
realizes ‘‘the system’’). Laboratory systems are an impor-
tant tool in science to check the usefulness of models, but




In summary, the abstraction of the formal model from
semantic models, i.e., the choice of system, will crucially
depend on the purpose of the model, the aims, and objec-
tives of the modeler. The degree to which details are rep-
resented and most of all which details are represented is
heavily influenced by the specific modeling purpose
motivating the model. This entails that the ‘‘size’’ of the
formal model, however defined, is not indicative of any
properties of an independently existing system an sich.
Attaching a measure of complexity to a formal model may
be useful to find out how hard it is to analyze the model,
how long it takes to simulate the model or how difficult it
will be to find solutions. Yet, such a notion of complexity is
more akin computational complexity measures (i.e., the
time complexity of an algorithm), which is conceptually a
very different thing to the kind of complexity we are after.
Complexity
In this section, we aim to develop a notion of complexity
that conceptually captures and describes the difficulty of
creating formal models from semantic models. Before
doing so, however, we will briefly introduce a concept of
complexity originally developed by the late theoretical
biologist Robert Rosen. During his life, Rosen has pub-
lished a number of forward looking books on theoretical
biology. One of the leitmotifs of his writings is complexity.
It would go well beyond the scope of this contribution to
give a comprehensive summary of the notions of com-
plexity due to Rosen. Suffice to say that his work has
gathered a small but dedicated followership among schol-
ars from all corners of the academy. By far the best known
of Rosen’s works is his book ‘‘Life Itself’’ (Rosen 1991).
One of the central themes of this book is the development
of a particular notion of complexity. The book is widely
read, and its notion of complexity makes a very good
starting point for the wider exploration of complexity. We
will therefore discuss it in some detail here, however,
without claiming that this is a comprehensive review of
Rosen’s work on complexity.
Rosen based his notion of complexity on organizational
properties of systems. So Rosen still assumes that the
notion of a system an sich is meaningful. However, rather
than analyzing any particular model of his system, Rosen
considers the space of all possible models. He then asks
whether or not within this space of formal models there is
at least one that represents the system as having the par-
ticular organizational property of being closed with respect
to efficient causation (CWEC); if it does, then the system is
complex, if not, then it is not complex. Rosen’s approach
avoids many of the pitfalls of quantitative notions of
complexity, in that it judges complexity based on a
spectrum of possible formal models, rather than on a single
formal model. The problem with this approach is that it is
still based on the idea of an independently existing systems
an sich constraining the choices of the modeler. As dis-
cussed above, this is a problematic assumption.
According to Rosen, a system is complex if it is
CWEC.3 The idea of CWEC is often illustrated in terms of
(abstracts) models of metabolic systems. At one level, one
can can think of metabolic systems as converting some
input into output. Rosen represents this as mappings from
some input set A to an output set B. This seems to be very
similar to familiar mathematical representations of bio-
chemical systems, except for one thing. Rosen recognizes
that the mapping between A and B, let us call it f, must be
somehow realized by a (material) component in the system.
This is what Rosen calls the efficient cause of the con-
version from A to B.
Once we accept that f is not just some mysterious action
in the system but must be implemented by an actual
component, then we must also accept that f could fail,
needs to be created and will decay over time. This begs the
question of the origin of f, how it is maintained or repaired.
To use Rosen’s notation, we can ask about the efficient
cause of f itself. To solve this, Rosen introduces, abstractly,
a new component, / that maps B into f; Rosen calls / the
efficient cause of f, and f the efficient cause of B. In this
new, expanded system every component has now an effi-
cient cause, except for /. There are two ways to solve this.
First, one may introduce yet another component to repair/
replace /; this is not satisfactory, because, as can be easily
seen, it would just create another component that is not
efficiently caused and thus lead to an infinite regress. The
second possibility is to close the circle by postulating that
one of the components already within the system acts as the
efficient cause of /. This then leads to a system where, in
Rosen’s parlance, every component is efficiently caused by
something within the system—the system is CWEC.
Rosen and his commentators have been particularly
interested in a particular type of CWEC system, the
so-called (M,R) system, which is allegedly the smallest
possible CWEC system. We will not discuss this in any
more detail here. Detailed discussions of (M,R)-systems
and CWEC can be found in the primary literature (Rosen
1991; Rosen 1999), but also in a number of reviews of
Rosen’s ideas (Chu and Ho 2006; Chu and Ho 2007b;
Letelier et al. 2004; Wolkenhauer 2002). This will not be
repeated here. However, a short reminder of the main idea
of CWEC is appropriate.
3 It has to be pointed out that complexity is not Rosen’s primary
interest, which is directed towards organizational principles of living
systems. Complexity is more an accidental fallout rather than the
main focus of his investigations. Hence he formulates complexity,
rather specifically, in terms of abstract models of metabolic systems.
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1. (M,R) systems are the simplest organizational realiza-
tion of an organism.
2. The organizational features of (M,R) systems cannot
be implemented in computers.
3. A system is complex if it is CWEC.
The first statement reflects Rosen’s interests as a theo-
retical biologist. More important for the current purpose is
the second statement. Rosen (1991) sketches a formal
mathematical proof that Turing machines (and thus by
extension all computers) by their very nature cannot have
this CWEC property. This proof has been controversial in
the past and is most likely wrong (Chu and Ho 2006,
2007a). We will argue below, however, that the conclusion
is nonetheless meaningful. The third statement is an
interpretation of the second statement in that it defines a
system as complex when it has this CWEC property. Given
that, as Rosen claims to show, computers are not CWEC,
this concept of closure possibly tells us something about
the limitations of models, and hence about complexity.
At this point we have to be careful because what we are
really interested in are properties of models. It is easy to
see that formal models are not CWEC. In the case of
computer models, the model itself could be identified with
the program code that defines it. Instead of entering the
program into a computer to compile and run it, one could
write it on a piece of paper. The information on this piece
of paper would be sufficient for anybody familiar with the
relevant programming language to understand what the
model is about. However, by itself, the code is not doing
anything. It just is some text on a piece of paper. In order to
be of any use, the instructions specified by the code on the
piece of paper, need to be executed, or in Rosen’s word, it
needs an efficient cause. This requires some external
agency or simply put a computer. So, nearly trivially,
formal models are not CWEC.
While formal models themselves are not CWEC, the
question we are actually interested in is whether or not
formal models can represent systems that are CWEC. We
think they can, or at least there is no reason to assume that
they cannot. Indeed, there are a number of previous con-
tributions reporting specific realizations of (M,R) systems
(Letelier et al. 2004; Letelier et al. 2006; Wolkenhauer
2002; Wolkenhauer and Hofmeyr 2007) as formal models.
A potential problem with these in silico implementations of
(M,R) systems, is that they rely on an external efficient
cause for execution. Typically, the components in these
models are matrices (to represent mappings). Clearly,
matrices do not map anything, but they are rather instruc-
tions for how to map and the mapping is then done either
by hand or by a computer. As such, these models or real-
izations of (M,R) systems probably fail to demonstrate
anything because they do not contain an efficient cause
within themselves (only descriptions of the action of an
efficient cause). We can think of more convincing ways to
formally model (M,R) systems. One way to do this is to
separate the model of the efficient cause from the efficient
cause of the simulation by one step.
Let us clarify this. One concrete possibility is to model
the components of Rosen’s (M,R) systems as dynamical
hierarchies (DH) (Gross and Lenaerts 2003). This means
that the simulation is based on some simulated ‘‘elementary
particles’’ that interact with one another and through their
interaction can aggregate to higher level objects—the DH.
The DHs have their own properties and behaviors and can
themselves aggregate to even higher level DHs. The rele-
vant point is that the properties of these higher level objects
are not explicitly programmed by the modeler (although
implicitly they are of course). The modeler only programs
the artificial physics of this simulated world. Each of these
DH can then be seen as causally depending on lower level
DHs (or elementary particles). The dependence on the
efficient cause of the executing machine is only indirect. If
the components of Rosen’s (M,R) system—f, / and B—
are implemented as such DHs, then this would make a
convincing case of a computational model of (M,R) sys-
tems, and thus of a complex system sensu Rosen. Admit-
tedly, so far nobody has been able to implement CWEC in
a computer model in this way, but this does not mean that it
cannot be done.
We conclude that computer models cannot be CWEC
themselves; this is a nearly trivial point. However, formal
models can represent systems that are CWEC, which as
modelers is all we want. This indicates that CWEC is not a
particularly strong condition. It is also unclear how CWEC
is relevant in the context of climate change or evolution,
domains that are often associated with complexity. This
leaves one now wondering why one should tie the notion of
complexity to CWEC. CWEC may or may not be inter-
esting as a description of organizational principles of living
systems, but it is not clear that CWEC is in any funda-
mental way limiting the modeling process. There is no
obvious reason why one should see it as the cause of the
perceived difficulty to model/explain/predict real systems.
There is nothing within the concept that points to limita-
tions of formal models or limitations of the modeling
process itself. Its relevance for complexity is therefore hard
to see. For this reason, we reject Rosen’s complexity as a
useful notion of complexity.
Beyond CWEC: radical openness
‘‘Closure with respect to efficient causation’’ means that
everything within the system can be explained, in efficient
causal terms, from within the system. We have seen that
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this is in fact not a particularly strong condition and could
be achieved within formal systems (although with some
difficulty). While CWEC is therefore by itself not suitable
as a basis for complexity, Rosen’s approach is pointing into
the right direction. Closure properties of systems are rele-
vant in the context of models and their interpretation, and
they crop up everywhere in modeling. For example,
experimental physicists go to great lengths isolating their
laboratory systems from interactions with the environment,
which is in essence creating closure—one kind of it.
Modelers in economics or biosciences will likewise place
great emphasis on finding abstractions that are approxi-
mately closed, at least over certain length and time scales.
Imposing this type of closure is a pre-condition for feasible
models.
To probe into these closure properties of systems, let us
extend Rosen’s analysis of (M,R) system. Rosen himself
was primarily interested in the idea of efficient causation
that is how components are maintained, while he was not
interested in other aspects of the (M,R) system, such as, for
example, the input A. This is of course not the only possible
focus. Instead of asking about components, say the com-
ponent f, one could ask about the mapping f in the system
and try to explain it. Why is it f rather than a different
mapping f0? This question has nothing to do with the effi-
cient cause of the component f but addresses the function of
f and why it is needed within the system. One could answer
this question by referring to the role of f in the (M,R) system
and the necessity for the element B for this system to work,
the availability of A, the input requirements of /, and so on.
This kind of question can be asked for every component of
the system, and the answer will always involve some kind of
reference to the function of the system as a whole.
In addition to asking questions about the components of
the (M,R) system one can also wonder about its input. Why
A? This is a question that Rosen dismissed as trivial, but we
do not think it is. There are a number of possible ways to
explain A. One possibility is to answer by reference to f and
refer to the fact that f can only accept specific types of
inputs. So, A is an input to the system because this is what
f requires. This only explains why A is taken as an input,
but not why the elements of A exist in the first place and
where they come from. In order to understand the origins of
A, it is necessary to extend the focus of the investigation
beyond the (M,R) system.
Let us examine a few possible answers to the ‘‘Why A?’’
question. It is conceivable that there are no further expla-
nations for A because A can contain everything in the world
that is not f, / or B. While a theoretical possibility, it is not
clear that the corresponding model would be very inter-
esting. The elements f, /, and B would need to be enor-
mous and encapsulate nearly everything there is (except for
A). The second possibility is to consider A as a limited
subset of what there is outside the system. In this case then
we can ask another question about A, namely, where it
comes from, and why it exists. One possible answer is that
the material components that make A could just be in
existence; they are a natural resource that does not require
any further explanation. This would only be plausible if
A is an elementary particle whose existence cannot be
further questioned. This will be the case only in the rarest
of modeling projects.
A more relevant scenario is that the resource A is pro-
duced by another system, let us call it (M,R)’ system. In
this case, the amount of A will depend on the production
rate of the resource, and its existence has to be explained
with reference to (M,R)’. Yet, explaining A in terms of
(M,R)’ does not solve the problem, it merely shifts the
explanatory burden onwards, which leads to an infinite
regress, similar to the one Rosen has identified. Only, in
this case we see no natural way to close ‘‘the system’’ and
avoid an infinite regress unless all included in the extended
model.
The process of asking for more and more explanations
dissolves the boundaries between the (assumed) (M,R) sys-
tems that we started with. We find that there is no natural
justification for considering the (M,R) system as a system an
sich, i.e., as having some special status of autonomy or
independence from the environment. The original focus on
(M,R) system is entirely an artifact of Rosen’s specific
interests in the organizational features of organisms. As this
interest is shifted, or as the purpose of the model changes, so
will the particular shape of the model. By asking questions
about A, what was previously a system, is now only a com-
ponent of a larger system. We achieved this simply by
changing our interests, by deciding that we are interested in
the origin ofA andwhere it is produced, rather than, as Rosen
did, focus on efficient causations. Both interests can be
motivated, but ultimately both are arbitrary in the sense that
none is, in a universal sense, superior to the other. At no point
did we assume that the ‘‘world’’ changed, but the systems
did.
More significantly, as we have extended the system, we
may also choose to reformulate our questions completely
and cease to insist on CWEC. We could develop very
different interest and decide that components such as / in
our original (M,R) system no longer are interesting. By
doing this, we re-draw the boundaries of the system in a
way that may cut across boundaries of the original
(M,R) and (M,R)’ systems, creating completely new sys-
tems in the process. How we re-draw these boundaries is
solely dependent on our interests.
To reach this conclusion, we started off with
(M,R) systems, but this was of course completely arbitrary.
No matter what our starting point, we would always have
come to the same insight that interests and the purposes of
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the modeling primarily determine our choice of what is and
is not included in the model. This is precisely what has
previously (Chu et al. 2003) been called radical openness.
Everything connects to everything else and the notion of a
‘‘system’’ only exists insofar as it is a pragmatic choice
valid for a particular modeling project.
The intuition behind radical openness is perhaps not
surprising, or particularly novel, but it certainly is an
unusual perspective for working scientists. Whenever a
researcher studies a particular system, she will instinctively
ring-fence the elements of her curiosity and assume nearly
everything within the domain of her interest as being fixed.
She will narrowly focus her attention on one particular
question. This is also what Rosen did who assumed that
everything outside his (M,R) system is given. In the actual
practice of scientific (or applied) modeling, there is no need
to explain everything, and it is good practice to assume
most aspects and elements of the model to be fixed, even
though this is only an approximation.
In the context of complexity, things are different and the
idea of radical openness is relevant because it is a force that
is ‘‘opposed’’ to the process of choosing boundaries
between system and ambiance and between focal phe-
nomena and the environment. This pragmatic process is
governed by choices and purposes including the aims and
objectives of the model, what kinds of questions it needs to
address, but also tractability issues in the case of formal
models and the availability of laboratory systems to test the
model. There is however no guarantee that for every
modeling purpose there is a clear choice of system that can
be contained within a useful formal model. Moreover, even
if there is one, there is no guarantee that for all purposes
there is a procedure to determine whether or not a partic-
ular choice of formal model is suitable for the purpose of
the modeling exercise. When containment fails, then
everything connects up with everything else and formal
modeling will become very hard.
Based on this, we conjecture that radical openness is a
cause of complexity, in the sense that there are circum-
stances when this radical openness cannot be contained,
and it is either not possible to identify a system, or it is not
possible to be certain that a specific choice of system is fit
for purpose. Radical openness is always present and not
limited to certain ‘‘systems.’’ Indeed radical openness is an
anti-thesis to the notion of ‘‘system.’’ However, whether or
not it does affect the modeling depends on the aims and
purposes of the model.
Contextuality
The idea of radical openness is that there are no natural
boundaries that define systems; there are just semantic
models, all of them connected together. A major aspect of
the abstraction process leading from semantic models to
formal models is to find suitable boundaries of models, i.e.,
the modeler has to make a choice as to what to include and
what to leave out from the model.
Drawing boundaries are not sufficient. The other task
that the modeler needs to accomplish is to find a suitable
encoding of the semantic models that is a representation of
the semantic models as a formal model. This process of
encoding has two components. First, a technical part that
includes a choice of the appropriate modeling technique
(i.e., whether to use differential equations, agent-based
models, etc.). In practice this decision can be very impor-
tant, but for our purposes more interesting is the second
aspect of encoding. This second part is about deciding the
level of abstraction that one requires. This step involves
ignoring much, or even most of the semantic models and
concentrating on a simple, yet suitable abstraction that
allows feasible formal models, while at the same time
representing sufficient detail of the semantic models to
make the model credible. It is worthwhile stressing here
again that the choice of what needs to be included into the
formal model and what is left out is primarily dictated by
the specific purpose of the model and the aims of the
modeler, but is also influenced by considerations of
tractability.
Each formal model defines a system, as discussed above.
If one now considers the space of all systems/models that
have been developed up to a certain point, then one will
notice that there is an overlap between some of these sys-
tems. This observation motivates the notion of contextuality.
There are several ways in which models can overlap. One
possibility is that two models (or rather the parts of the
models that overlap) differ only in trivial ways and are
otherwise the same. The differences may only be due to the
requirements of the particular modeling methodology, i.e.,
choices such as the programming language or the formalism
used, or they may be minor choices of the model design that
do not in any way influence the behavior of the model.
The difference between two models may go deeper than
that and there could be significant differences in the levels
of detail used in the model. One model A may be a coarse
grained version of the other model B. So, for example,
model A could be a model of the DNA as a string of
Watson–Crick pairs, whereas B is a detailed model of the
same DNA that takes into account the chemical structure of
the individual nucleotides. Both A and B will overlap in
that they represent the same conceptual entity in roughly
the same way, but to different degrees of detail. In this
case, it is possible to compare both models and to decide
whether or not the difference in representation is of prac-




As far as contextuality is concerned, the most interesting
possibility is when the two representations are orthogonal.
This means that models A and B both contain abstractions
from the same conceptual entity, but they are not in a clear
refinement relation to one another. In this case, it is no
longer meaningful to compare models A and B; they are
incommensurable in that their abstractions are motivated
by different purposes and goals. While these models are not
in a refinement relation to one another, it may still be
possible to have a model C that combines the orthogonal
representations of the shared conceptual entity in A and B.
It is helpful to illustrate this using an example. We
choose as an example various ways to model DNA mole-
cules which can be conceptualized in different ways.
– DNA as code In many models,, DNA is represented as a
carrier of information or as a code. This representation is
particularly popular in models of simulated evolution. In
such models, DNA could be implemented as a binary
string encoding some information [see, for example,
(Mitchell 1997)]. More sophisticated models use a
4-letter alphabet to represent the string [see, for example,
(Chu et al. 2005)]. Technically, DNA represented in this
way could be implemented as an array, a data structure
that is supported in many programming languages.
– DNA as a physical object Bio-physicists may be
interested in DNA as an object in space and time
which takes specific shapes and conformations depend-
ing on the ambient conditions [see, for example,
(Sneppen and Zochhi 2005)]. One may ask questions
about its properties, how fast it folds, how flexible it is,
and so on. Such models will not need to represent the
information carried by the DNA, but only the properties
of the molecule as a polymer, its flexibility, its
interactions with the environment, and so on. In these
models, one could conceptualize DNA as a generic
polymer consisting of a number of links that are
allowed a certain degree of freedom relative to each
other. Simulation models could take into account
chemical properties of the individual base-pairs and
how they interact with one another, but there is also
some scope for equation-based approaches. Simple
models would embed the DNA in 2D space and more
sophisticated ones would take into account 3D move-
ment of the individual base-pairs. The representation of
DNA in this case cannot simply be an array, but it must
contain spatial aspects of the individual monomeric
elements of the DNA, and how they interact. While the
representation is likely to be more involved than in the
previous example of DNA as information, models of
DNA as a polymer are not refinements of models of the
DNA as information, because they focus on entirely
different aspects.
– DNA as information carrier One may ask about the
properties ofDNAas carrier of information.What are the
physical and chemical properties ofDNA that enable it to
store information? What are the properties of base-pairs
and their interactions that allow the DNA to fulfill the
role it has in organisms? Models to address this type of
question need not take into account what the information
contained on the DNA is, but they must consider the
properties of the constituent parts that allow this
information to be preserved. So, one needs to worry
about the stability of DNAmolecules, howmutations are
prevented (see, for example, (Sneppen and Zochhi 2005;
Eigen and Schuster 1979)), and so on. The flexibility of
the DNA as a polymer is not of interest here. Formal
models to address this question could use equations
describing local interactions between base-pairs, and
probabilistic models of the mutation rate, possibly also
information theoretical models to understand the princi-
ples of information storage and transmission. These
formalmodelswould not represent spatial conformations
of the DNA nor the information it contains.
– DNA as a string of binding sites Interaction of proteins
withDNA require the former to find specific binding sites
on the DNA (Chu et al. 2009; Wunderlich and Mirny
2008). The process of proteins locating their binding sites
can be modeled as a random walk. DNA is then
represented as a string of binding sites for transcrip-
tion-factors. In these models, a binding sites corresponds
to a sequence of nucleotides, and the strength of the
binding between the nucleotide and the protein depends
on how well this sequences matches an optimal binding
motif of the protein. Again, one could represent DNA as
an array in computermodels, yet the interpretation of this
array is very different to the above case of DNA as code.
Again, such representations are orthogonal to the repre-
sentation in the other models.
Each of these abstract representations of DNA can be
ring-fenced, in the sense that one can exclusively focus on
one while ignoring the possibility of others. The biophys-
ical properties of DNA can be studied in isolation from the
information the DNA carries, and the chemical properties
can be investigated without having to worry too much
about how resistant DNA is to mutations. Sometimes, there
is partial encroachment of one aspect onto another one. For
example, if we want to understand how proteins scan the
DNA, then the spatial arrangement of the DNA as a mol-
ecule may be important. Yet, often this encroachment can
be contained by crude approximations. For example,
binding sites are often represented as rods distributed in
3D-space (Slutsky et al. 2004). This mimics the limited
flexibility of DNA (individual rods) and the spatial
arrangements of the molecule.
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Some modeling projects may require that aspects are
combined; for example, one may represent DNA as code
and its spatial arrangement in the cell. In general though,
focusing a model on one (or few) contexts is arguably
essential to keep the scale of the modeling project within
the limits of feasibility; this may not always be possible.
The real fundamental problem contextuality can pose is
when it is unclear which particular abstraction is the correct
one that is which simplifications are suitable and which
ones are not, which contexts must be included and which
ones are irrelevant. One situation when this could be the
case is when there is no laboratory system available that
can be used to test the model, although it should be stressed
that this is neither sufficient nor necessary a condition. Yet,
when there is no laboratory system, then it is often difficult
to gauge the suitability of a given abstraction for the par-
ticular modeling purpose. A topical case in point is climate
change modeling which suffers from tremendous uncer-
tainties precisely because there is no way to check a model
against a laboratory system. Interestingly, even in this case
it will still be possible to check whether or not the results of
the formal model are correct given any particular model
definition. The process of developing a model is where
complexity originates.
In the previous paragraph, we implicitly assumed that
leaving out contexts may sometimes severely impact on the
performance of a particular model relative to its specific
purpose. Given the scope of this article, we will not be able
to fully justify this claim in this contribution, although we
will make a few remarks. A common problem of models,
particularly, predictive models that can be traced back to
missed contextuality are unforeseen side effects. Such side
effects are usually a mismatch between a predictive model
of an intervention into a system and the actually observed
behavior. Another way in which contextuality makes itself
felt are couplings between phenomena that have been
ignored in the model. Seemingly unimportant contexts can
prove to couple the system of interest to apparently unre-
lated phenomena; missing this can render the entire model
invalid. This is no problem as long as the model can be
corrected, but could be a big problem if there is no pos-
sibility to test the model before it is used. A few examples
elucidate this:
– The development of novel drugs suffers from the lack
of a suitable laboratory system to test their effects. To
be precise, the interaction of drugs with their environ-
ment can be tested in laboratory systems and can to
some extent also be modeled formally. It is not
particularly challenging to understand how various
proteins interact with specific target molecules in the
laboratory. The results of in vitro research do not
always translate well into the in vivo situation. When
drugs interact with the living organism then new
aspects come into play. The active ingredient may take
a number of different roles in vivo and lead to entirely
unforeseen side effect. This is simply due to the fact
that within the living organisms, there are potentially
many more contexts than have been taken into account
during in vitro testing. From a modeling point of view,
the problem is that it is not known beforehand which
contexts of an organisms may or may not be relevant
and under which conditions. While there are laboratory
systems to test drugs, these are not suitable for the
purpose of understanding the effects of the drug in
vivo.
– Climate change is a prime example of a modeling
problem where the consideration of contexts is essen-
tial given the purpose of the exercise (i.e., prediction of
how the climate is going to change in response to a
given amount of CO2 emission). As an example one
can think of the role of the world’s oceans. They are not
only important regulators of the air temperature, they
are also carbon sinks, reservoirs of humidity, they host
entire climate-relevant eco-systems, and so on. Each of
these roles is a different contexts, and in practical
climate modeling tasks it is unclear which ones are
important and how they should be represented. The
main problem is not primarily the size of the climate
models, but to know which effects to include and which
ones to leave out.
– Contextuality is also apparent in economics modeling.
One aspect of contextuality is that agents in economic
systems have multiple roles, say, customers, stock
owners, employees, consumers, but they are also voters
(in democracies) and polluters of the environment.
These multiple aspects of the entities in the system can
have grave consequences when trying to predict or
explain the behavior of economies.
Case study: evolution
In this section, we will briefly describe a few examples to
indicate how complexity manifests itself in practice. All
the examples in this section relate to evolution, but com-
plexity will affect the various models in very different
ways.
Natural evolution
There is a whole branch of theoretical biology trying to
explain the observed traits of behaviors in organisms by
reference to their evolutionary origin. An example is the
problem of the origin of social behavior. This is often
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formulated in terms of dilemmas. A behavior that benefits
the group may be detrimental to the individual. Naively,
one may assume the individual displaying such group
beneficial behavior is selected against, with overall detri-
mental effects on the group. Siderophores in bacteria are a
case in point. Bacteria secrete siderophores (Buckling et al.
2007; Griffin et al. 2004) into the environment to liberate
iron from the host. Collectively, the bacteria can achieve
high enough a concentration of siderophores to liberate
adequate amounts of iron. There is a dilemma in this sce-
nario in that synthesizing these siderophores comes at a
metabolic cost. The benefits are shared amongst all bac-
teria. This ‘‘shared resource’’ creates an incentive for each
cell to ‘‘cheat.’’ Any cell that stops producing siderophores
would continue to benefit from the iron liberated, essen-
tially at the expense of other cells. In the long run, cells that
do not produce siderophores will grow faster and have
more offspring (because they can divide faster), i.e., they
are fitter in an evolutionary sense.
Social dilemmas of this sort are often studied using
formal models. In these models, the evolving entities are
typically abstracted to the point where they are represented
as pure strategies; the concept of fitness is formalized as a
pay-off that is allocated to strategies depending on the
entire population of strategies and depending also on the
environment. The aim of these formal models is, usually, to
understand under which conditions the temptation to cheat
can be overcome, i.e., under which conditions group-ben-
eficial strategies can evolve. Considerable research effort
has been invested into investigating this and similar sce-
narios to the effect that we now understand the general
conditions that support the evolution of social behavior. At
least one reason for the success of this research program is
that the models ignore nearly all properties of the systems,
except the (presumed) relative benefit of strategies for the
bearer.
The question we want to ask is whether or not this type
of group selection problems are complex or not. To begin
with, one may think that they are. There is no real-world
laboratory system which can be used to test the theoretical
models. There may be instances of group selection in real
biology, but it is difficult to corroborate specific models
experimentally. After all, there may be many factors con-
tributing to the evolution of siderophores, and the particular
host environment may play an important role. This sug-
gests that the problem is complex (which would chime well
with the more general impression that evolution is a
complex problem).
On the other hand, the debate on group selection is often
made with reference to itself, rather than with reference to
actual systems. In the mainstream literature one may find
weak references to biology; however, fundamentally, the
debate on group selection is a debate on theory. Based on a
relatively small number of theoretical scenarios [such as
the prisoners’ dilemma (Fletcher and Zwick 2007; Worden
and Levin 2007)] theoretical models are developed to
investigate the emergence of cooperation. Typical ques-
tions are how the evolution of cooperation depends on the
spatial structure of the evolving entities (Traulsen and
Nowak 2006; Santos et al. 2006) or what precisely the
mechanisms are that allow social dilemmas to be overcome
[i.e., group selection versus kin selection versus inclusive
fitness (Buckling et al. 2007; West et al. 2007; Wild et al.
2009)]. To what extent these conditions are actually real-
ized in real systems is secondary. The purpose of these
models is not (at least not directly) to predict or explain any
particular real world phenomenon, but rather to settle a
theoretical question. Contextuality and radical openness are
not a problem because the models are designed to avoid it.
Hence, there is no complexity in this research question, at
least not in the way it is commonly approached.
It is instructive to contrast this with a different types of
problem in evolution: the evolution of bipedalism in
humans, i.e., the question as to what our walking on two
legs (rather than on four) is an adaptation to. One would
expect that there was at some point in the evolution of
humans a set of circumstances that made it favorable to
walk upright. What could those circumstances be? There is
no shortage of possible conjectures. For example, one
could speculate that bipedalism evolved as humans moved
out into the savannah which is dominated by high grass;
standing upright enables one to see predators coming from
far away, which gives increased fitness (via a reduced
chance of being eaten). Upright walkers had more off-
spring, hence bipedalism evolved. This is one possible
narrative (or at least a caricature of one). The problem is
there are many others that are at least as plausible.
Coming up with apparently plausible stories is easy. The
problem is to decide between competing explanations or
even to get a rigorous understanding of the plausibility of
any particular scenario in the first place. At the root of this
difficulty, one may conjecture, is the lack of a laboratory
system to test the plausibility of any account of the evo-
lutionary origin of a feature. This was also the case in the
group selection scenario. The key difference between these
cases is 2-fold. For one, the question about bipedalism is
about a specific biological system, and much less is it a
theoretical question that can be considered independently
of any empirical context. Moreover, bipedalism cannot be
regarded purely as a strategy that is separated from other
aspects of the organisms. The transition from walking on
four legs to walking on two legs requires rather significant
anatomical changes that may impact on a number of other
aspects of the life strategy of the organism. For instance, in
order to walk on two legs, the hips need to be recon-
structed. Apart from being a necessary part in the basic
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stability of the organisms, hips also constrain the birth
canal in females, which may affect reproductive strategies.
Bipedalism frees up front-legs for other tasks, which may
impact on foraging/hunting strategies and also social
interactions. Bipedalism impacts on the heat economy of
the organism in that it changes the area that is directly
exposed to solar radiation. This could explain the loss of
fur in humans, which in turn enables novel ways of heat
regulations (i.e., sweating) that are not effective in animals
with fur and there may be further ranging impacts on many
other aspects of the species (i.e.,, sexual behaviors, social
structures, and so on).
This example illustrates how contextuality and radical
openness together can create uncertainty about what needs
to be included in a model and what can be left out. The
radical openness manifest itself through the uncertainty
about what is and what is not important. Does the effect on
the heat economy need to be modeled, or can it be left out?
Contextuality enters the modeling problem through the
various roles that elements in the models play. In our
(somewhat oversimplified) example above, it all starts with
the hip that has at least two roles; from there it spirals out,
bipedalism affecting phenomena that are seemingly unre-
lated to upright walking. Maybe bipedalism and its evo-
lution can be modeled within a single context, but we
cannot be sure. We have no way to tell. The various con-
texts of a hip couple, at least potentially, the mode of
locomotion to the mode of procreation to the mode of
regulating the organism’s temperature and maybe to many
other things that we have not considered; yet maybe it does
not. The problem of modeling the evolution of bipedalism
is that there is no laboratory system to help the modeler to
draw the boundaries and define a particular system. We do
not know which aspects are important and which ones are
not. We therefore cannot be certain about the quality of the
models. As a result, many explanations are proposed, and
one is as good or bad as another one. This is complexity.
It is instructive to contrast the specific problem of how
bipedalism evolved in humans with the more general
problem of how bipedalism evolved. An example is a
model by Hase and Yamazak (2007) who use evolutionary
algorithms to evolve the ability to walk upright in robots.
Their model or set-up is successful because its purpose is
very narrowly focused on evolving a control system for
robots, and it is not about understanding how bipedalism
evolved in humans. Superficially, their research question
seems closely related to the question of the evolution of
bipedalism in humans, but fundamentally it is not. The
purpose of one is the reconstruction of the evolutionary
origins of bipedalism in a real system, which leads to
problems of radical openness and contextuality. By shifting
the attention away from the evolutionary origin of a feature
of a real species to problems of bipedalism as a control-
system a change of focus happened that removed all the
complexity. The robots can be confined into a laboratory
environment. Hase and Yamazak effectively draw the
boundaries and create a system by defining a specific
problem which is tractable and most of all whose solution
is testable. The cost is that their results are no longer rel-
evant for how upright walking evolved in humans. This
stresses again: It is the purpose that is complex, not the
‘‘system’’ itself.
Artificial evolution: tierra
In our second example, we will now consider the inverse
problem of evolution. Rather than attempting to construct
an evolutionary narrative to explain a specific observed
trait, there have been many attempts to harness the power
of computers to re-create evolution in silico (Adami 1998;
Langton 1989). One of the earliest attempts to do this is
Ray’s Tierra system (Ray 1996). It consists of self-repli-
cating computer programs that compete with one another
for access to process time within a (simulated) processor.
Each individual program is a number of instructions writ-
ten in a purpose designed machine language. The envi-
ronment in which these digital ‘‘creatures’’ live is an
addressable memory space. In this sense, the Tierra
organisms live in a spatial world and they are spatially
extended in their environment. Upon replication, random
errors may be introduced into the offspring with a low
probability which simulates mutation events. When seeded
with a hand-programmed ancestral replicator then an evo-
lutionary arms race kicks off in Tierra where more efficient
replicators replace their hand-programmed ancestor at first,
and are then eventually themselves replaced by even more
efficient individuals. The evolution in Tierra is driven by
limited access to CPU time. Hence, there is an adaptive
pressure towards fast self-replication.
Quite deservedly, Tierra has initially been received with
enthusiasm by the community. One of the reasons for this
excitement is that Tierra creatures evolved unexpected
strategies to increase their fitness. One such strategy is
parasitism, where replicators use the code of other repli-
cators. Parasites then triggered an evolutionary arms race in
the course of which one observes the evolution of immu-
nity to parasites and hyper-parasites amongst other strate-
gies. It is notable that all these strategies rely crucially on
each individual Tierra organism being spatially extended,
which allows other organisms to encroach on each other.
Undoubtedly, the evolution of the digital creatures in
Tierra is fascinating. However, it is also limited. Tierra
does not produce new variants, novel niches, and strategies
indefinitely. In every run, after not too long, evolution
reaches a creative plateau. From then on no more inter-
esting variants are created. Mutation events continue to
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introduce genotypic variety; yet after the evolutionary
plateau has been reached these new variants only enjoy a
brief spell of life, before they die out again. This leveling
off of evolutionary activity in Tierra is not a consequence
of limitations of genotype or phenotype space. The pro-
gramming language in which Tierra’s individuals are
written, so to speak the code of its genome, is Turing
complete and can be used to express any conceivable
algorithm. Yet, this practically unlimited space of possi-
bilities is never explored during the evolution of the
system.
This observation of limited evolution is not specific to
Tierra, but generalizes to all other computer-simulation of
evolutionary systems. Many variants of and improvements
to Tierra have been proposed since [see, for example,
(Adami 1998)]. Yet, no matter what the sophistication of
the system, they all share the basic effect of evolution that
is leveling off eventually (Bedau et al. 1997). One may
speculate about the reason for this limitation. One expla-
nation is the lack of complexity or the lack of both radical
openness and a rich contextuality within all these simula-
tion models. This needs to be understood in the following
sense: As far as modeling of real world systems is con-
cerned, complexity depends on the particular purpose of
the modeling exercise. When we say that Tierra is not
complex then we mean that there is no model of Tierra
(i.e., no model of the model) that suffers from limitations
due to radical openness or contextuality.
Regarding the radical openness, this is nearly trivial.
Computer programs are their own largest models and
themselves fully specified by their program code. It is
slightly more difficult to argue that computer programs are
of low contextuality. In essence this means that, if one
modeled artificial computer worlds (i.e., if one attempts to
model the computer model), then there would be only very
few orthogonal abstractions. This is for a good reason:
Every additional context significantly complicates the
effort of programming the model and increases the likeli-
hood of introducing bugs and errors. It is therefore
instinctively avoided both by modelers (who seek sim-
plicity by nature) and computer programmers (who do not
wish to over-complicate their task).
Arguably, in Tierra, there are only two contexts. One
context is to model Tierra as a population of self-repli-
cating entities. Each individual is assigned a random
number that determines the rate with which it copies itself.
Offspring inherit this number, but mutations may slightly
adjust the replication rate, and so on. This model would
miss out many of the interesting facets of the Tierra world,
but it would represent others quite well.
The other context that can be modeled is the spatial
extendedness (in the sense that each Tierra organism
occupies a certain area of the memory space of the
simulated Tierra-world.4) In order to be able to model the
parasitism as it occurs in Tierra, this spatial aspect must be
taken into account, but for other aspects of the system it is
less relevant. For each of those contexts, there could be a
multitude of models with different degrees of details.
Ultimately, these two contexts exhaust all there is in Tierra.
If regarded as a system an sich in its own right, Tierra is
therefore extremely impoverished as far as contextuality is
concerned.
We conjecture that it is this lack of contextuality that
severely limits evolution, in that it limits the possible side-
effects and repercussions of new mutations, how novel
strategies can spread across the system and create new
niches. Once a Tierra organism replicates at the maximally
possible rate, then there is no room left for improvement.
There is no niche creation. The optimization of the repli-
cation aspect does not interfere with anything else in the
simulated organism. In the real world, evolutionary adap-
tations may spread far beyond their immediate origins, to
unexpected places.
Discussion and conclusion
In this article, we assumed that complexity is the difficulty
to generate models. We identified two main causes for
complexity in this sense, namely, radical openness and
contextuality. Both of these ideas entail that there is no
such thing as a system, at least not in the sense that the
world is partitioned into well separated entities that are just
waiting for a modeller to describe them. Elements of rad-
ical openness and contextuality have been in various forms
described before in different contexts. It is worthwhile to
conclude this article by pointing to some of these prede-
cessor ideas, and to briefly indicate how they relate to the
present framework.
The notion of radical openness has elements of hierar-
chy theories that have been proposed over the years. Two
of the best known ones are Salthe’s ‘‘Evolving Hierarchical
Systems’’ (Salthe 1985) and Ahl and Allen’s ‘‘Hierarchy
Theory’’ (Ahl and Allen 1996). The idea of hierarchy
theories is that nature is organized into different strata that
are in a non-symmetric relationship to one another. So, one
stratum could be that of atoms, another one that of cells,
yet another one is society. Clearly societies contain
organisms that contain cells, and cells consist of atoms,
hence there is a hierarchy of levels. Understanding levels
are important, both philosophically, but also from a
4 This is not to be confused with the memory space the simulated
objects take in th physical computer on which Tierra is implemented.
This memory space, while practically of importance is of no
consequence for the behavior of the model.
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pragmatic scientific point of view. Philosophically, one
incarnation of hierarchies is the reductionism debate. Sci-
entifically hierarchies make themselves felt, for example,
in the difficulty to simulate multiple scales concurrently.
While we do acknowledge that studying levels are
essential, in this article, we have quite consciously avoided
introducing scale and hierarchical levels into the discus-
sion. This is not because we think it is irrelevant, and not
because we think that there is nothing left to be said about
this topic. The reason we avoided talking about hierarchies
is that the concept is so difficult and invites a discussion
that can easily sidetrack from the main point of this con-
tribution. Once we talk about levels, then we also have to
say, what these levels are, where they begin, and where
they end. Is the mitochondrion at the same hierarchical
level as the cell, or is it at the level of the cell wall or a
rather at that of proteins? The more one attempts to drill
down questions of this sort the more one will need to refine
the notational toolkit to be able to say anything useful
about complexity and modeling.
While talking about hierarchy in natural systems is
difficult, introducing the idea is not even necessary for our
purpose. In this article, we have been concerned with the
question of what makes modeling difficult, rather than
asking about the structure of natural phenomena. We also
acknowledged that modeling is an inherently pragmatic
activity. The structure of a model depends primarily on the
aims and objectives of the modeller, rather than on some
assumed structure of the world. Hence, how a mitochon-
drion relates to the cell as a whole and how it relates to
proteins depends on the aims of the modeller. It is not an
inherent property of the world.
The notion of hierarchy as we intuitively understand it is
encapsulated in the concepts of radical openness and con-
textuality, in that scale is an important reason why models
have to be truncated and artificially closed. At the same time,
contextuality is more than hierarchy. Hierarchical organi-
zation is only one of the factors that force the truncation of
models. Even at the same scale there may be couplings
between phenomena that will be left out by modelers (or not,
depending on the question at hand). Conceptualising trun-
cations in terms of hierarchical levels are not always
insightful. As an example, think of a hypothetical modeling
problem of how the economy of countryX couples to climate
change and how a changed climate couples back to the
economy. For the modeller, it is irrelevant whether the
economy and the climate are the same hierarchical level.
What matters is how they are coupled together and how the
semantic understanding of a connection between these
phenomena can be represented in a formal model. Hence,
while hierarchy theory provides some of the ideas that are set
forth in this contribution, for the purpose understanding
modeling the question of hierarchies is secondary.
Another apparently related issue is that of meaning or
semantics and its role in biological systems in the way it is
often studied in biosemiotics [see, for example, (Hoff-
meyer 2009)]. Again, we would not deny the usefulness of
understanding the meaning of meaning in biology or any
other aspect of science. However, the role of ‘‘semantics’’
as in semantic models is a completely different one.
Semantic models are about the interpretation of a formal
model in the head of a scientist. It is the idea that in order
for models to become part of the scientific corpus they
must add to scientific understanding, where understanding
is intrinsically semantic. It is crucial to stress that accepting
the distinction between semantic and syntactic models does
not entail any assumptions about the contents of semantic
models. These semantic models could be about the ideas of
biosemiotics, but they could equally be the semantic
models of an ultra-reductionistic scientist who denies the
significance of meaning altogether.
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